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Abstract. The credibility and accountability of a central bank, 
acting in an inflation targeting regime, are essential because they allow a 
sustainable anchoring of the inflationary anticipation of economic 
agents. Their decisions and behavior will increasingly be grounded on 
information provided by the central bank, especially if it shows 
transparency in the process of communicating with the public. Thus, 
inflationary anticipations are one of the most important channels through 
which the monetary policy affects the economic activity. They are crucial 
in the formation of the consumer prices among producers and traders, 
especially since it is relatively expensive for the economic agents to 
adjust their prices at short intervals. That is why many central banks use 
response functions containing inflationary anticipations, in their inflation 
targeting models. The most frequently problem in relation to these 
anticipations is that they are based on the assumption of optimal 
forecasts of future inflation, which are, implicitly, rational anticipations. 
In fact, the economic agents’ inflationary anticipations are most often 
adaptive or even irrational. Thus, rational anticipations cannot be used 
to estimate equations for the Romanian economy because the agents who 
form their expectations do not have sufficient information and an 
                                                 
* Ideas in this article were presented at the Symposium „The global crisis and reconstruction of 
economics?”, 5-6 November 2010, Faculty of Economics, Bucharest Academy of Economic 
Studies. 
Theoretical and Applied Economics 
Volume XVIII (2011), No. 2(555), pp. 195-206 Amalia Cristescu, Mădălina Ecaterina Andreica 
 
196 
inflationary environment stable enough to fully anticipate the inflation 
evolution. The inflation evolution in the Romanian economy helps to 
calculate adaptive forecasts for which the weight of the "forward 
looking" component has to be rather important. The economic agents 
form their inflation expectations for periods of time that, usually, 
coincide with a production cycle (one year) and consider the official and 
unofficial inflation forecasts present on the market in order to make 
strategic decisions. Thus, in recent research on inflation modeling, actual 
inflationary anticipations of economic agents which are revealed based 
on national opinion surveys are being used. 
As a result of a previous study testing the equations of an inflation 
targeting model for Romania, the authors of this article attempt to 
correct the estimators of inflationary anticipations depending on the 
central bank reaction, based on the results of a national survey among 
the population. However, in order to have a more accurate picture of 
inflationary anticipations and the propagation mechanism of shocks 
affecting price stability, an analysis of the pricing behavior of the 
consumer goods bidders in the national economy is also needed. 
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The strategy of inflation targeting include the recognition of importance 
of the inflationary phenomenon in modern economies, meaning therefore that 
ensuring price stability is the most effective way to support through monetary 
policy the general objective of long term economic growth. Widely used in 
industrialized countries in the 90s, the strategy of inflation targeting became an 
attractive alternative for emerging economies as a result of the crises in Latin 
America and Asia. 
In order to achieve the target-level of inflation, the central bank uses the 
rules as “guiding elements for building the monetary policy” (Svensson, 1997), 
not being obliged to apply them in a mechanical manner. The central bank 
retains the ability to respond to unanticipated shocks by adjusting the level of 
the monetary policy instruments, provided that the central bank does not 
sacrifice the final objective. 
Inflation expectations play a central role for conducting monetary policy. 
Since many central banks have explicitly or implicitly adopted an inflation 
targeting regime, stabilizing inflation expectations has become the primary 
policy objective. Because there is a lag between policy actions and its impacts 
on the central banks target, monetary authorities are guided by forecasts. This 
makes inflation forecasting essential for effective monetary policy. Although 
monetary authorities seek to stabilize long-term inflation expectations, 
monitoring short and medium-term inflation is important as well. Whenever 
inflation exhibits some inertia, good short term inflation forecasts translate into 
more-accurate longer-term projections.  
An influence of communication on inflation expectations is possible in 
two ways. First, the gap between realized and expected inflation can be 
influenced by the rhetoric of the central bank. Second, the communication could 
directly influence the expectations formation process. Thus, the way an 
indicator is formulated can have a great influence on inflation expectations, 
whereas the impact on the gap between inflation expectations and realized 
inflation does not seem to be robust. A possible interpretation is that the 
rhetoric of the Central Bank communicates risks to price stability in a credible 
way and that financial market experts react to the announcements by adjusting 
their inflation expectations in the short run. The influence arises because the 
indicator seems to summarize information that would otherwise be provided by 
different macroeconomic variables that are publicly available. 
The arguments in favor of greater transparency rest on two pillars – 
accountability and efficiency. The first stresses the importance of transparency 
for ensuring the public can hold policymakers accountable. This rationale for 
transparency resonates strongly among supporters of central bank 
independence. With independence comes accountability, and accountability Amalia Cristescu, Mădălina Ecaterina Andreica 
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requires transparency. The second argument for transparency is that it improves 
economic efficiency, in terms of either the operation of financial markets or the 
implementation of policy.  
Transparency may also improve the ability of monetary policy to achieve 
its goals by ensuring that private market expectations are consistent with the 
aims of central bank policy. In the forward-looking new Keynesian model that 
is widely used for monetary policy analysis, for example, the effectiveness of 
monetary policy depends on the policy’s ability to affect expectations about the 
future path of interest rates (Woodford, 2003). A transparent policy – one that 
reduces uncertainty about future policy actions – can improve the trade-off 
between output and inflation objectives.  
Both arguments in favor of transparency have been challenged. Critics of 
formal inflation targeting argue that any regime that holds a central bank 
accountable for a single objective – such as achieving an inflation target - may 
lead the central bank to ignore the effects of its actions on broader measures of 
economic welfare. This is a general problem in designing incentive 
mechanisms; a high powered incentive scheme works best when actions can be 
monitored closely
(1).  
Furthermore, some analysts argue that transparency may actually reduce 
the central bank’s ability to engage in stabilization policies. This last argument 
is, perhaps, not surprising. Much of the academic literature examining 
transparency uses models in which monetary policy has real effects only to the 
extent that it can surprise the public. By creating an inflation surprise, the 
central bank is able to stimulate real output. Since the public cannot be 
systematically surprised under rational expectations, the attempt to engineer an 
economic expansion only leads to an average inflation bias. If transparency 
reduces the central bank’s ability to generate surprises, it weakens the central 
bank’s incentive to engage in expansionary policy and, as a result, lowers the 
equilibrium rate of inflation. Transparency would seem to be unambiguously 
advantageous (Faust, Svensson, 2002). However, if the central bank’s scope for 
engaging in stabilization policies is also a function of its ability to generate 
surprise inflation, transparency reduces that ability. 
This limits the potential for policy to reduce economic fluctuations. 
Transparency may leave the central bank unable to cushion the real economy 
from macroeconomic shocks, a cost emphasized by Cukierman (2001). 
Economists now have a great appreciation for the role that systematic, 
predictable policy can have on the real economy. There are not just surprises 
that matter. The effects of transparency may differ considerably when the 
predictability of the monetary policy plays an important role in the economy
(2). Estimation of Inflationary Expectations and the Effectiveness of Inflation Targeting Strategy 
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It is well understood that monetary policy in general and inflation 
targeting in particular is what is called “management of expectations” 
(Woodford, 2004, 2005). Monetary policy affects inflation and the real 
economy mainly through its effects on private-sector expectations about future 
interest rates, inflation and the real economy. Expectations of future instrument 
rates (the expected instrument-rate path) matter and affect the yield curve and 
longer nominal interest rates. 
Expectations of future inflation affect actual inflation and longer real 
interest rates. Expectations of future developments of the real economy and 
longer real interest rates affect current decisions and plans for the real economy. 
Thus, transparency makes monetary policy more effective in a direct way, by 
making possible more effective management of private-sector expectations. 
Publishing inflation and real-economy forecasts is already common 
among inflation-targeting central banks. An interest-rate forecast or some 
assumption about the interest-rate path is necessary for an inflation and real-
economy forecast. Central banks have used different assumptions about the 
interest-rate path, such as a constant interest rate or a path given by market 
expectations as revealed by the forward rates implied by the yield curve. A 
constant interest rate is often a conspicuously unrealistic and time-inconsistent 
interest-rate forecast. Implied forward rates may result in inflation and real-
economy forecasts that do not “look good,” and central banks using this 
interest-rate assumption have sometimes felt compelled to comment that an 
interest-rate path higher or lower than the implied forward rates would be more 
appropriate 
Furthermore, a published forecast of the interest rate is useful to the 
private sector and a better forecast is more useful to the private sector. The 
central bank should have an obvious information advantage about its own 
intentions for its instrument rate and be able to produce the best forecast, and, 
as argued in the previous section, publishing its own interest-rate forecast 
should be the most effective way for the central bank to manage private-sector 
interest-rate expectations. Given this logic, and given the increased acceptance 
of the idea that monetary policy is about managing expectations, it is rather 
strange that still so few central banks publish their own interest-rate forecast. 
Some arguments in the literature against publishing instrument-rate paths 
seem somewhat contrived. Morris and Shin (2002) shows that public 
information may reduce social welfare. Because public information is known by 
all private agents and will affect the behavior of all private agents, it is rational 
for each private agent to attach more weight to public information than to 
private information. If the public information is of poor quality, private agents Amalia Cristescu, Mădălina Ecaterina Andreica 
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end up attaching more weight on poor-quality information, which may 
deteriorate social welfare.  
We think that the optimal targeting weight balances the need for 
accountability with the imperfect ability to monitor the central bank. 
Monitoring is imperfect if the information on which the central bank bases 
policy is private and publicly unverifiable. The ability to monitor can also be 
described in terms of the policy “transparency”; a transparent policy improves 
the ability to monitor. If monitoring is perfect, the central bank is instructed to 
care only about achieving a state contingent target for inflation; this solves the 
accountability problem without distorting stabilization policy. When monitoring 
is incomplete due to imperfect information, it is optimal to place less weight on 
achieving the inflation target to avoid distorting stabilization policy. 
  Political pressures are assumed to operate on the incentive to engage in 
expansionary policies. These pressures lead to socially undesired fluctuations in 
inflation. Inflation shocks provide a role for stabilization policies. 
Empirical analysis 
In these circumstances the central bank tries to achieve inflation target by 
interest rate channel of monetary policy. The central bank reaction function 
correlate inflation rate with interest gap, interest rate’s long-term trend, output 
gap, inflation deviation from target and real exchange rate variation:               
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The variables included in the reaction function are: 
  the interest rate gap’s previous level. When including this variable, the 
central bank is acting cautiously as it considers the adverse 
consequences that frequent interest rate changes can have on economic 
agents. Harjes and  Ricci (2008) show that the corresponding 
coefficient for this variable is generally quite high in order to ensure 
that the monetary authorities are restraining themselves from 
aggressively countering economy shocks. Thus, monetary authorities 
avoid sudden changes in rates, a phenomenon known in practice as 
“smoothing and stabilizing the interest rate”. 
  the interest rate’s long-term trend. The reason for including this 
variable is logical: on the long-term, the interest rate tends toward its 
equilibrium value, thus determining the convergence to the model’s 
equilibrium point. 
  the inflation’s deviation from the target. The central bank will adjust 
the nominal interest rate depending on the inflation’s deviations from Estimation of Inflationary Expectations and the Effectiveness of Inflation Targeting Strategy 
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the target. The coefficient for this variable must be higher than 1 in 
order for the monetary policy’s mechanism to function. 
  the output gap. When including this variable, the practice of a flexible 
inflation targeting is considered, as well as the determining role the 
excess demand has in explaining inflationary pressures. 
  the real exchange rate variation. The presence of this variable in 
reaction function equation is necessary to describe the correlation 
between domestic interest rate and real exchange rate fluctuation in 
order to improve monetary policy concerning Mundell-Fleming model 
requirement
(3). Furthermore a style concordance with aggregate 
demand and supply equation is also necessary.  
  other shocks of the monetary policy that can influence the behavior of 
monetary authorities when dealing with inflation targeting (estimating 
residuals). 
Since the data is expressed quarterly and the inflation target annually, we 
computed the quarterly inflation target. It is obvious that this feat can only be 
achieved for the 2005-2009 timeframe, as inflation targeting was implemented 
starting with 2005. For the 2000-2005 timeframe, the effective inflation’s trend 
was used as the inflation’s target. 
The equation of the reaction function can be written as follows: 
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                [9.407413]             [2.626591]                      [2.941367]                       
                   (0.0000)                 (0.0071)                         (0.0148)                          
 
) ( 3 ) ( _ mod_ 0421 . 0 t t real curs ε + × +  
                     [4.131510] 
                       (0.0004) 
 
The equation highlights the practice of a flexible inflation targeting 
strategy, by considering in the central bank’s reaction function the inflation’s 
deviation from the target and other macroeconomic variables, such as the output 
gap, or the appreciation/depreciation of the national currency. Including the 
inflation’s variation from the trend indicates that the monetary policy transmits 
its effects with delays and therefore it has to react timely to the inflationary 
pressures that will manifest themselves in the future. 
Adaptive expectations 
Adaptive expectations state that if inflation increased in the past period, 
people will expect a higher rate of inflation in the next period, meaning that 
people base future predictions on what happened in the past. In the real world, Amalia Cristescu, Mădălina Ecaterina Andreica 
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past data is one of many factors that influence future behavior. In particular 
adaptive expectations is limited if inflation is on an upward or downward trend. 
These limitations led to the development of rational expectations which 
incorporated many factors into the decision making process.  
The adaptive expectations of inflation were estimated based on a survey 
conducted on a representative sample at a national level, mainly focusing upon 
the state of the economic and social cohesion in Romania
(4). Since the 
population's attitude towards the national institutions is important for this study, 
we decided upon including the National Bank among the other institutions 
considered representative of the market economy system. The main results of 
the survey indicate that the National Bank is the most credible institution in 
Romania (with a degree of confidence of about 53% – to large and very large 
extent) being considered far more reliable than other national institutions. The 
second best credible institution turned out to be the local educational system (a 
46% confidence level – to large and very large extent). Another aspect that 
should also be noted consists in the fact that the reliability in the European 
Parliament exceeds the confidence level in the other national institutions. Given 
the high level of credibility of the National Bank, we can formulate the 
hypothesis that the signals of the National Bank do have a great influence in 
shaping the inflationary expectations of the population. 
 
What extent do you trust the following institutions?  
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Another question included in the questionnaire took into account the 
population concern about the general price increase (the increase of the daily 
living cost). The results of the survey show that the population is very 
concerned about the inflation outlook (90% of responses indicate a large and 
very large extent). Such an attitude creates conditions for a positive framework 
to the “hot money” phenomenon, meaning that inflation expectations could be 
accelerated by population’s anticipations. Estimation of Inflationary Expectations and the Effectiveness of Inflation Targeting Strategy 
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How much you are worried about increase in cost of living (price 
increase)? 
Very much
59,8%
N/A
0,2%
Very little / not at all 
1,8%
Small extent 
7,5%
Largely
30,7%
 
 
The distribution of the responses concerning the inflation expectations 
upon different product categories is very interesting, indicating an asymmetry 
of the extreme preferences, meaning that the degree of supporting inflationary 
expectations for small and moderate levels (2.5 to 6%) is high, then drops 
abruptly to 6-8% and then rises again sharply to over 8%. This reveals a certain 
confusion regarding the inflation perspectives among the population. In terms 
of statistical significance of population indicators, the results are perfectly 
normal, since there is still no basic economic culture to allow the population a 
relatively accurate interpretation of macroeconomic indicators (being evident 
from the media errors on the correct interpretation of these indicators). In these 
circumstances it is normal that the answers to have like referential a simple 
comparison of figures with a normal correction in relation to the great concern 
about the inflationary expectations. 
 
Which category of prices will increase and in what proportion? 
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In these circumstances, we reviewed econometrically the response 
function equation of the National Bank, by introducing the estimated inflation 
adaptive expectations of the population. Despite the correction time, we notice 
an improvement in the econometric response function equation of the National 
Bank, both in terms of coefficients and of significance tests. 
+ − × + × + × = − ) ( 0930 . 0 4711 . 0 7203 . 0
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The results encourage us to continue our research in estimating the 
inflation adaptive expectations of the entrepreneurs (the representatives of 
suppliers). In this manner, we can verify the National Bank estimations of the 
inflation targeting strategy equation, in a constructive framework for ideas 
exchange among the specialists in the field, in order to improve the 
effectiveness of the economic policies to control the inflation phenomenon. 
Conclusions 
The analysis emphasizes the essence of the inflation targeting strategy: 
the monetary policy has a key role in anchoring inflationary expectations. On 
the other hand, considering the period of transmission for the mechanism of the 
monetary policy and the unexpected shocks that can affect an economy, 
inflation targeting becomes inflation forecast targeting, thus stressing out the 
strategy’s anticipative character and its capability to stabilize the inflation 
around the target for a medium-term time frame. 
Many central banks use reaction functions containing inflationary 
anticipations, in their inflation targeting models, but there is a problem 
concerning the assumption of anticipations: rational vs. adaptive (even more 
irrational). Testing the reaction function of central bank, we tried to compare 
this alternative assumption based on national survey. The survey revealed that 
the central bank is the most credible institution for Romanian and the 
Romanians are very worried about inflationary context.  
As a novelty, we valued the information obtained from the survey 
regarding the population's perceptions on the evolution of inflation, by 
introducing them as adaptive expectations in the reaction function of the 
National Bank. Thus, we noticed an improvement in the econometric 
estimations based on these adaptive expectations. Estimation of Inflationary Expectations and the Effectiveness of Inflation Targeting Strategy 
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 Notes 
 
 (1)  See Walsh (2003) for an application of this principle to inflation targeting. 
(2)  The reliance on models in which surprises are the key to the real effects of monetary policy 
may be one reason that Carpenter (2004) finds only a limited set of lessons for policymakers 
to learn from the academic literature on transparency. 
(3)  It is a common fact that the central bank diminishes the interest rate when there is an 
unjustified appreciation of the national currency (the exchange rate drops) and it increases 
the interest rate when the national currency goes through a powerful depreciation (the 
exchange rate increases) 
(4)  PN II Research Project no. 91-050/2007 - Diminution of inequalities - pre-requisite for 
economic and social cohesion. Improving the quality of the European integration. The 
survey was conducted on a nationally representative sample from March to September 2010. 
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